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Abstract 
 
A coherent method to measure the effectiveness of a monetary policy improves 
the monetary authority’s management capacity and renders the possibility of applying 
sound policies prior to and during a crisis. The trend in employing complicated and 
ambiguity-bearing unconventional monetary tools in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis 
has increased the value of such a method. The aim of this paper is to introduce a 
coherent and consistent monetary policy evaluation method for Turkey. Accordingly, 
we suggest that innovations in the spread between overnight interest rates and 
Treasury auction interest rates are informative for exchange rare, output and prices. 
Empirical evidence for this identification reveals that positive innovation in spread 
(implying a tight monetary policy measure) decreases output temporarily, 
permanently decreases prices, and appreciates local currency. This result is also 
robust to alternative specifications.  
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1. Introduction 
Finding a proper measure and evaluation method for monetary policy are still 
among the most tempting pursuits of the economic literature. Conventional pure 
monetary policy suggests that central banks can utilize interest rate tools by directly 
adjusting short-term funding rates and by engaging in open-market operations or 
regulating reserve requirement ratios, which in turn affect market liquidity and long-
term interest rates. Therefore, in the literature, short-term interest rates, monetary 
aggregates such as M1 and M2, and non-borrowed reserves (NBRs) are generally 
accepted policy tools and innovations in these variables are taken as measures of 
monetary policy. 
Although these monetary tools are handy, their manipulative effects on the 
actual target variables depend on other effective factors, such as fiscal policy, 
developments in highly integrated world markets over which monetary policy has no 
or highly limited control, and domestic macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, the 
tools themselves are mostly correlated with consumer and investment behaviors, 
which may affect the main monetary targets and rates in the same or different 
directions. Thus, monetary policy exhibits endogeneity stemming from the 
interdependence of monetary aggregates and the real economy bridged by the 
financial sector. For this reason, it is not an easy task to identify a monetary policy. 
Mishkin (2011) noted that theoretical and practitioner economists try to impose 
financial frictions into general equilibrium models to account for interdependence. 
Accordingly, price stability increases eagerness in the search for yield and financial 
institutions become involved in risky investments through increasing leverage and 
currency/maturity mismatches. Referring to Johnson (1988), Woodford (1994) stated 
that monetary policy alterations should be transmitted to financial market prices to 
effect broader price measures and thus the real economy. Therefore, distilling the pure 
effects of monetary policy is quite knotty.  
Some various methods proposed in the literature fail to give accurate results 
under stress because of various deficiencies. For instance, monetary aggregates such 
as M1 or M2 are used as measures of monetary policy or as measures of liquidity. 
However, a country’s economic conditions can affect these aggregates and thus 
central banks may be unable to control them. Moreover, many studies in the literature, 
such as Friedman and Kuttner’s (1992), state that monetary aggregates and monetary 
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targets are barely cointegrated and that the money-income relationship broke down 
after the 1980s. 
As another policy indicator, NBRs, which measure the difference between a 
bank’s total reserves and borrowed reserves (from the central bank), have been 
introduced as a variable that can be more easily controlled than M1 and M2.  For 
instance, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Pagan and Robertson (1995) both 
reported that when NBRs increase, short-term interest rates tend to decrease. Kasa and 
Popper (1997) and Shioji (2000) also agreed on NBRs as an indicator of monetary 
policy. Although most of the literature is on developed countries, Berument, Sahin 
and Togay (2011) used analogue of NBRs as a monetary policy indicator for Turkey. 
Their new measure also includes the net liquidity provided to the system by a central 
bank after accounting for the central bank’s involvement in the foreign exchange 
market. However, as Gali and Gertler (2007) suggested, allowing the money stock to 
adjust interest rate would cause interest-rate volatility. Since volatile interest rates 
would narrow the investment horizon, real economy deterioration well might be 
expected. Besides that, as Laurent (1988) and Woodford (1994) mention, weakening 
relationship between money and target economic variables has required more 
dependable monetary policy measures since the 1980s. Indeed, Bernanke and Mihov 
(1998) found no statistically significant empirical evidence that US monetary policy 
was properly measured by NBRs except for during the 1979-1982 period.      
 Interbank or central bank funding rates have also been frequently used as 
monetary policy indicators. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Sims (1992) considered 
Fed’s funding rate as a measure of monetary policy for the US by assuming that 
funding rate is deterministic on depository institutions’ reserves and thus on private 
investors’ investment decisions. Sims (1992) considered short-term interest rates 
when estimating a VAR model for five countries: France, Germany, Japan, the UK, 
and the US. Even if their innovation in short-term interest rates well explains output 
behavior, the authors’ methodology for interest rates produced inconsistent estimates 
on prices and exchange rates compared to expectations (puzzles). Eichenbaum (1992) 
revealed that when short-term interest rates are used as a monetary policy indicator, a 
contractionary policy might raise prices: the opposite development to what might be 
expected. Similarly, Grilli and Roubini (1995) discussed the exchange rate puzzle as 
an anomaly encountered when local currency depreciates in the face of contractionary 
policy shocks rather than appreciating. There are various efforts devoted to the 
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solution of these puzzles in the literature. For instance, Sims (1992) argued that 
inserting additional information variables into the VAR model might give greater 
insight to the policy maker. Following this logic, he empirically demonstrated for a 
series of developed countries that adding the commodity prices to the model could 
solve the price puzzle. Bernanke et al. (2005) also tried to overcome the problem by 
suggesting a factor-augmented VAR approach to capture even more information in 
the model. However, both efforts seem to have gone unrewarded because central bank 
interest rates are still used as policy variables, especially during crises with the 
presence of puzzles. Arestis et al. (2011) pointed out that the price puzzle persists 
under the highly volatile environment of the European economy and attributes this to 
the currency crises of 1992 and 1993, and even to the 2008 sovereign debt crisis. 
Moreover, as noted by Berument (2007) and Berument et al. (2011), central banks of 
small open economies face additional challenges that central banks of developed 
economies do not face. Current account balance deficits (which give rise to 
sustainability problems) or having insufficient foreign exchange reserves to control 
exchange rates are among some of the severe concerns of small open economies. 
Thus, the two concerns are also left unaddressed.  
From the information above, it can well be asserted that, especially by the 
2008 crisis, it has been practically experienced that the conventional policy measures 
(such as a narrow definition of money, NBRs, or funding rate) frequently used in the 
literature the literature give neither sound nor sufficient results the literature give 
neither sound nor sufficient results. Consequently, central banks have developed 
altered versions of previous monetary tools to implement their policies, such as 
required reserve ratios. For instance, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
(CBRT) introduced a segmented required ratio policy called the Reserve Option 
Mechanism (ROM). Accordingly, banks are allowed (though not obliged) to keep 
60% of their required Turkish Lira (TL) reserves as foreign exchange (Euro and US 
Dollar (USD)) and an additional 30% as gold. As an incentive, foreign exchange and 
gold are accepted with higher coefficients.
1
 In this way, the CBRT decreases liquidity 
                                                 
1
 As of October 1, 2012, the first 40% of the allowed foreign exchange partition of required domestic 
currency reserves is accepted by being multiplied with 1.1. The coefficients for each subsequent 5% 
increase are 1.4, 1.7, 1.9, and 2, respectively. On the other hand, while the first 20% of the gold 
allowence is accepted 1 to 1, the following two 5% increases are rewarded with coeffeicients of 1.5 and 
2, respectively.      
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without altering interest rates and accumulates foreign exchange reserves to enhance 
resilience against foreign shocks.    
In this paper, we do not incorporate these new variables into the econometric 
model to identify a monetary policy. However, because such actions by central banks 
alter liquidity in the market in the short run rates relative market demand that can be 
measured in the long run rates: The difference between short- and long-run interest 
rates is to be the measure of monetary policy. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is 
to introduce a new measure of monetary policy for an innovative central bank, i.e., the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. 
We introduce the spread between interbank and Treasury auction rates as a 
measure of monetary policy. Interbank rate is a measure of the overnight funding rate 
for the financial system and Treasury auction rate is a measure of the return on 
investment in the long run. We assume that private sector expectations are based on a 
comparison of the monetary policy rate (which is interbank rate here) with the 
Treasury auction rate for at least three reasons: 1) the comparison contains enough 
expected yield information to encompass most of the available determinants; 2) the 
bond market can be complementary and supplementary to other financial markets, 
depending on the given economic conditions, and thus accepted as the financial 
friction; and 3) the comparison is simple to observe for policy makers and market 
participants alike. 
Berument and colleagues (2007 and 2011) tried to identify certain monetary 
policies by employing various different identification specifications. In these studies, 
the system is identified by the policy practices that the CBRT employed at a given 
time. In the 2007 paper, for instance, the authors employed the spread between the 
interbank interest rates and the constant daily but variable month-to-month 
depreciation of domestic currency. The motivation of that study was a unique CBRT 
practice: according to the above-noted policy, the CBRT had targeted keeping TL 
returns (interest rates) higher than the depreciation rate (change in exchange rate). 
Another study was launched based on a CBRT announcement that they would 
abandon their policy of direct intervention in foreign exchange markets in 2001. 
Berument et al. (2011) recognized that this identification was not relevant after 2001, 
the CBRT continued interventions by implementing irregular foreign exchange 
buying/selling auctions. In the paper, the authors noted that liquidity is injected into 
the system not only through Open Market Operations but also through buying foreign 
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exchange. In this regard, they defined a new NBR that also includes the liquidity 
provided by foreign exchange purchases/sales. However, since November 2010, the 
CBRT has employed a new set of policy tools (one may visit IFF, 2012, for further 
discussion of this issue) so that neither real return on domestic return is guaranteed, 
nor are CBRT purchases of USD used to stabilize the exchange rate and provide 
liquidity. The current paper is an attempt to come up a measure that is immune to 
these policy changes.  
Turkey experiences a fair amount of monetary policy shifts as a result of 
and/or in order to control its highly volatile macroeconomic conditions. Such 
conditions have existed since the mid-1970s, mostly as a byproduct of high and 
volatile inflation rates. Further, beginning with the second half of the 1980s and 
intensifying after the millennium, Turkey has undergone several structural reforms, 
either to establish new markets (such as stock exchange and bond markets) or to 
regulate and supervise existing markets. Moreover, in its last three decades as an open 
and fully liberal economy, Turkey has been sensitive to global fluctuations and crises. 
Monetary policy has had to be frequently adjusted, with the business cycles. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to study the Turkish experience when searching for 
empirical evidence for a monetary policy measure.     
In Section 2, we provide the motivation for why the spread can be used as a 
measure of monetary policy. We explore the method and major challenges of VAR 
methodology (puzzles) in Section 3. After discussing the data in Section 4, we discuss 
in Section 5 the implication of our specification of Turkish monetary policy 
developments. We present the empirical evidence and provide a set of robustness 
analyses in Section 6, and conclude the paper in Section 7. 
 
2. Interbank–Treasury Spread as a Measure of Monetary Policy 
There is an undeniable gap between theory and the real economy. In a wide 
range of literature, from comprehensive orthodox economics to lately emerged 
heterodox views, all efforts focus on closing this gap. Current discussions on the 
imposition of the financial dimension on monetary models since the onset of the 
recent global crisis have re-emphasized this point. Thus, while overnight funding rates 
are on hand to affect short-term market interest rates, we need a transmitter, a kind of 
a bridge to set the relation between the monetary policy/objective and output/target 
variables. As noted in the previous section, we have enough reasons to use the 
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Treasury auction rate as this bridge. Moreover, as well elaborated below, we believe 
this rate captures economic agents’ long-term funding costs. The spread between 
overnight rates and Treasury auction interest rates bunches the cost and return of 
credit for the financial system. Figure 1 shows the trajectory of these two rates for 
Turkey, except for a few crisis-period Treasury rates that exceeded the central bank’s 
policy rate. Whenever the monetary authority decides to alter interest rates (by 
directly shifting the short-term policy rate or changing the reserve requirement policy) 
the depository institutions determine their new positions by comparing the new 
interest rate with longer-term credit facilities. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
In the literature, Laurent (1988) recognized that short-term rates are under the 
influence of the central bank by their manipulative power over the funding rate. On 
the other hand, although funding rate may affect many monetary aggregates, there is 
no straightforward reason why the monetary authority’s funding rate intervention 
should directly affect economic activity. Allowing solely the level of funding rate to 
measure the effectiveness of monetary policy is not explanatory enough. Moreover, 
movement of the funding rate in either direction can create different results, 
depending whether the rate is expansionary or contractionary. In the same study, it is 
assumed that funding rate can increase if credit demand increases, which means that 
altering the policy rate occurs in an expansionary environment. Similarly, funding rate 
can also increase if enough credit is absorbed out of the market by the monetary 
authority to set a contractionary policy.  
In this paper, we take interbank rate as the short-term funding rate, over which 
the monetary authority has full manipulative power, either by setting it or guiding it 
by providing short-term liquidity through buying/selling short-term bonds, 
buying/selling foreign exchange, or setting the composition of required reserves. We 
also take the Treasury auction rate as a measure of or proxy for the return rate of 
financial agents such as depositors’ savings or the supply of credit by commercial 
banks. The reason for determining auction rate as the other leg of the spread is clear: 
Treasury yields, especially benchmark bond yields, affect borrowing costs, which in 
turn affect level of investment, equity values, consumption, employment, and finally, 
output.  
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In numerous studies, spread notion has been defined to correlate with different 
macroeconomic variables. Many of these studies have taken the spread between short- 
and long-term interest rates according to a most reasonable explanation, which can be 
summed up as the relative insensitiveness of longer-term interest rates to monetary 
policy. For instance, Laurent (1988) defined spread as the difference between the 20-
year bond rate and the federal funds rate, while Stock and Watson (1989) defined it as 
the difference between one-  and 10-year Treasury bond rates. Bernanke (1990) 
suggested various spread definitions, such as the difference between the long-term 
Baa credit rating corporate bond rate and a 10-year Treasury bond rate, or as the 
difference between the overnight funds rate and a 10-year Treasury bond rate, and 
stated that the commercial paper-Treasury bill spread emerged as the best predictor. 
More recently, McCallum (2005) used one-period and two-period bond interest rates, 
whereas Nautz and Offermanns (2008) took the difference between the Eonia and 
three-month Euribor interest rates to measure European Central Bank’s monetary 
policy. Berument (2007) introduced a slightly different spread definition, comparing 
currency depreciation rate with the short-term interest rate for Turkey.      
The question thus becomes: Why do we use the Treasury auction interest rate 
but not anything else for Turkey? Answer: First, we cannot use constant maturity 
interest rates because the Turkish bond market is not as deep as more-developed 
markets such as the US; there is thus no constant maturity benchmark note as 
employed in similar studies on the US economy.  
Second, we could have taken the benchmark bond rather than the average of 
Treasury auction rates, as that is frequently used in similar studies dealing with US 
data. Indeed, there exists a benchmark note in the Turkish bond market according to 
which other bonds’ performances can be measured. However, this benchmark bond 
has a shorter maturity and can be changed at any time with any other bond,
2
 which 
brings out the problem of volatile maturity. It must also be noted that the Treasury 
determines the maturity along with the interest rate. As the Treasury changes the 
benchmark bond,  it then also changes the prevailing interest rate. Eventually, if we 
use the benchmark bond with the interbank rate to obtain the spread, when the 
                                                 
2
 The Treasury bond with a maturity date of February 20, 2013 was the benchmark note at the end of 
the data time span of this study; however, while this paper was being drafted, the bond was changed to 
one dated March 5, 2014.  
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Treasury changes the benchmark it could be signaling a monetary policy shift when in 
fact it is not.   
Then the question becomes: Why do we use Treasury auction rate if we cannot 
use the benchmark? Answer: By definition, auction maturity changes in each auction. 
Using Turkish Treasury auction data between 1988 and 2004, Berument and Yucel 
(2005) reported a statistically significant stable negative relationship between 
maturity and auction interest rate. Thus, as auction maturity increases interest rate 
decreases. The authors argue that Treasury is willing to lower the maturity for its 
borrowing and increasing the interest rate rather than rely on pure interest rates while 
the economy faces an adverse shock. Otherwise interest rate should have been 
increased too much. Since this relation is stable, auction interest rate alone captures 
the credit cost for the depository institution.  Thus, we may use auction interest rates 
alone rather than interest rates and maturity together.  
Treasury bond rates are the main interest rates that derive the asset sides of 
financial institutions. The key factor that correlates the central bank funding rate and 
auction rate is the amount of government bonds that financial institutions hold on 
their balance sheets. The government bonds-to-total assets ratio of the commercial 
bank’s consolidated balance sheet was 26.4% on average between 2002:12 and 
2011:07;
3
 therefore, interest rate gains from the bonds constitute a significant share in 
banks’ profits. While auction interest rates in the primary market are highly correlated 
with secondary bonds’ market rates through expected yields, the rates on banks’ bond 
holdings directly affect credit and deposit rates. Moreover, relative movements in 
funding rates and capital gains are determinant for private banks to supply credit to 
investors and households. Thus, the link between monetary policy and real economy 
is bridged, and henceforth, we define the spread as “interbank rate minus Treasury 
auction rate”. A higher overnight rate relative to auction rate (with all other factors 
unchanged) indicates a tighter monetary policy, and because the central bank provides 
a lower level of liquidity to the market compared to what the market accepts, we 
normally expect output and prices to decline in the consecutive periods. 
An interest-rate-spread–based indicator as a determinant of monetary policy is 
expected to reflect all information related to the market. A central bank may change 
                                                 
3
 Data gathered from Turkey’s Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency’s statistics data base: 
http://ebulten.bddk.org.tr/AylikBulten/Gelismis.aspx. 
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the level of money reserves within the banking system, which in turn directs the 
overnight rate to move. As a result, depository institutions usually assess differences 
between the overnight rate and the market returns of securities and loans (which have 
longer maturities) as captured by the auction rate. Depository institutions may want to 
affect economic activity by expanding the money stock level via buying securities in 
the case that a central bank policy rate falls down. Demand for the several 
components of monetary aggregates may be influenced by the deregulation of interest 
rates. It is not clear, however, why the monetary authority affects the supply of 
deposits and money via changing the movement in addition to the associated interest 
rate and economic activity changes. Thus, the spread (the difference between short-
term rate and auction rate) may be a good indicator of monetary policy. It may be 
beneficial to use the properties of this measure such that in expansionary monetary 
policy the spread innovation is negative. Assuming that the other economic variables 
are constant, monetary policy is expansionary when short-term rates decreases and 
vice versa. 
The spread also exhibits that short-term rate action may not be attributed to 
monetary policy. In solving the puzzles, using spread is superior to using interest rates 
at level because the rates may expand or contract.  Clients’ increasing demand for 
credit may increase rates, which may show either a rise in the amount borrowed or a 
decline in the amount saved. This situation implies that in the case of an expansionary 
environment interest rates increase. A rise may also be attributed to a decline in the 
amount of liquidity that the monetary authority provides to the market. Therefore, it 
would be useful to follow the movements of money as well as market liquidity when 
we are annoyed about the state of the economy.  
 
3. Model 
In identifying the effects of policies exclusive to a central bank, it is important 
to set policy indicators that are largely insensitive to other variables. To do this, we 
set up a VAR model as suggested by Christiano et al. (1999) and the references cited 
therein.  
The economy is assumed to be in the form of a linear stochastic dynamic 
model. Without considering the constant term, one may write:   
Γ(L)y=ε,          (1) 
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where the lag operator in the matrix polynomial Γ(L) is denoted by L, the data vector 
is denoted by y, and the vector of interpretable disturbances is shown by ε. It is 
assumed that for s>0, ε(t) and y(t-s) are uncorrelated in determining the model and 
data vector. It is also assumed that the coefficient on L
0
 which in Γ(L) is Γ0, is 
nonsingular. In the case that equation (1) holds, having considered the stochastic 
assumptions on   and y, the matrix containing the coefficients denoted as B(L) in a 
reduced  to a VAR: 
 y(t)=B(L)y(t)+u(t),               (2) 
that is, related to Γ with the following equation: 
I-B(L)= Γ-10 Γ(L).         (3) 
In addition, the covariance matrix shown as Λ of ε has a relation with the covariance 
matrix Σ of u with the following equation: 
Γ0 Σ Γ
-1
0= Λ,          (4) 
where Γ0 is a nonsingular matrix that is normalized so that it has ones on the 
diagonals and shows the contemporaneous relationships between the variables in the 
vector y(t). In the case that there exist no a priori conditions on Γ(L), there also exist 
no conditions on B(L). Depending on the condition that other parameters are 
integrated or concentrated out, the likelihood, which is a function of Γ0 and Λ, is 
dependent to the data through S, which is the estimated covariance matrix for u, that 
is, the reduced-form residuals. In the case that there exist restrictions on Γ0, which 
make it identifiable, it is possible to find the flat-prior posterior mean or mode using a 
nonlinear maximization or integration that depends only on S. In the case that having 
tried a broad range of identification schemes on Γ0, it is not necessary to apply the 
identifying restrictions in the formation of S or to restore S. This conceptual structure 
is useful because it does not involve any restrictions that include Γs, with s > 0, 
although the knowledge we have for  Γs for s = 0 is scarce and for any s > 0 it is none. 
For now, it is better not to treat our information on Γ0 and Λ, and carry the informal 
information on Γs for s > 0.  We will examine the estimated systems where formal 
identifying restrictions are put on Γ0  and  Γ in the VAR model.  One may also visit 
Sims and Zha (2006) for further discussion of this issue. 
We make two basic assumptions regarding the model. First, exchange rate is 
exogenous for the domestic economy at a given time period but interacts with other 
variables with a lag. This is a reasonable assumption because Turkey is a small open 
economy, and thus short-term capital inflows are the main driver of exchange rates 
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and move according to the relative conditions of rest of the world. Thus, in our 
monthly data, we assume the CBRT responds to contemporaneous developments in 
the exchange rate, rather than leading it. The period where CBRT had depreciated the 
local currency with a pre-determined path (or the period that was well predicted by 
the market) ended in March 2001. Therefore, in this period, the depreciation rate is 
also pre-determined to spread (see Berument (2007) for discussion on the issue). 
Thus, even if the CBRT was influential in setting the exchange rate for the pre-March 
2001 period, exchange rate would still precede the spread.  
Second, we assume the interest rate spread is exogenous for other 
macroeconomic variables such as income and prices at a given period. That is, 
parallel to Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) and Sims and Zha (2006), innovation in 
spread leads to innovation in income and prices rather than the opposite at a given 
time. This is also a reasonable assumption, because a central bank cannot observe the 
real level of prices and output at the time of decision due to data-gathering trouble, 
and it is more likely that current interest rate affects current output and prices. 
However, all variables in the system interact with each other with a lag. 
To identify the system, we need to consider the identifying restrictions on Γ0 
and  . Thus, parallel to Leeper et al. (1996) and Sims and Zha (2006), we employ the 
Choleski decomposition and assume that there is no contemporaneous effect of 
monetary policy on disturbances in the general price level or the level of income. We 
use this restriction because no contemporaneous data exists for these variables when 
policy decisions are being made. If we place the monetary policy variable after the 
output and prices, we would have the extreme information that the central bank knows 
both variables before they set their policy actions. If we had been using quarterly data, 
then we could assume that the central bank could observe monthly data within each 
quarter (or at least the industrial production of the first month and the price levels of 
first two months) before they set their policy rate and then placement of income and 
prices before policy rate would make more sense. One may look at Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) for discussion on this issue.  
 
4. Data 
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The monthly Treasury auction interest rate is the weighted average of each 
auction’s interest rate for the corresponding month, excluding consumer price index 
(CPI)-linked or foreign exchange (FX)-denominated or FX-linked auctions.
4
 
Industrial production is taken as a measure of income; CPI is taken as a 
measure of prices. The exchange rate (exchange) is the official exchange basket that 
the CBRT has been following in its operations: 0.5 USD + 0.5 Euro.
5
 Interbank rate is 
the CBRT’s overnight interbank rate. Money (m) is M2 plus Repo volume. All data 
are available from the data delivery system of the CBRT.
6
   
The sample starts in 1988:08 due to data availability and ends in 2011:07, 
when the CBRT abandoned overnight rates as a policy rate, and switched to over-
week rates. However, we extend the data span to 2012:07 at a later stage of the 
analysis by using the overnight borrowing cost. During the estimation, we include 11 
monthly dummies to account for seasonality and five intercept dummies (for 1994:04, 
1994:05, 2000:11, 2001:02, and 2001:03) to account for financial crises. The intercept 
dummies take the value of 1 for the corresponding month and 0 otherwise.   
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
 
5. Spread as a Measure of Monetary Policy and Developments in the Turkish 
Monetary Policy 
Figure 2 reflects the cumulative sum of interbank–auction interest rates spread 
innovations gathered from the VAR specification. Downward movement of the graph 
implies an expansionary monetary policy, while upward movement implies a 
contractionary monetary policy.  
                                                 
4
 The Treasury opens auctions for various maturities each month. Here, we disregard these different 
maturities for each auction when we calculate the Treasury auction interest rate for each month. 
Therefore, the auction interest rate that we use is a mixture of several “forward rates”, which is implicit 
in the term structure of interest rates with different maturities. In other words, the auction interest rate 
variable is a pooled time series of forward rates with different maturities. Calvo and Guidotti (1992) 
and Missale and Blanchard (1994) argued that there is an inverse relationship between auction interest 
rate and maturities. Empirical evidence from Turkey suggests that this relationship does exist (see 
Berument and Yucel, 2005). Therefore, the “variable-maturity” auction interest rate variable that we 
use is a monotonic transformation of the “constant-maturity” auction interest rate that one might use to 
measure fiscal policy, and thus we can use the (variable-maturity) auction interest rates as an indicator 
of fiscal policy as suggested by the envelope theorem.      
5 The Euro was introduced in 1999. For the period that we do not have data, we use the official 
convention between the Euro and the Deutsche Mark (DM) and use the basket as 0.5 USD + 0.974027 
DM.   
6 http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html. 
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We can analyze the graph in comparison with historical developments and 
policy choices. For instance, a relatively tight policy environment can be seen from an 
increasing trend between the first quarters of 1990 and 1991. This trend corresponds 
to the implementation of the CBRT’s own balance-sheet–oriented money program, 
which was the bank’s first publicly announced medium-term program (January 16, 
1990). Its targets were to control an increase of the CBRT’s balance sheet and to 
restrain monetary easing. The transition effects of these targets were expected to be 
price stability over the following four years. It should be noted that the program was 
only implemented for one year, not four, despite a comparatively stable political 
environment of a one-party government, which would not be experienced again in 
that decade.  
In Figure 2 an expansionary period between 1991 and 1993 can be observed 
with a downward movement, which reflects the politically unstable environment of 
the time. Early general elections were held on October 21, 1991, as well as an 
unexpected presidential election (which indeed carried the head of government to the 
presidency) after the death of the president on April 17, 1993. The campaign stage of 
the 1994 local elections also occurred in this period. These developments paved the 
way for populist expansionary policies. It must be noted that the independence of 
CBRT policies were in question during this period, and Treasury and other public 
institutional borrowing from the CBRT were still customary. Monetary expansion of 
the same period continued throughout 1993, with the newly elected prime minister 
announcing that he would decrease interest rates to boost the economy.  
The monetary easing period ended with the April 1994 financial crisis, which 
resulted in a stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund in June 1994. 
The shift can be tracked in Figure 2 by a sharp increase at that date, representing a 
sudden tightening.  
However, following another early election call in the next year, the stand-by 
agreement was canceled and a new era of loose monetary policy continued until 
December 1999 (a long downward movement can be seen in Figure 2 between 
December 1994 and October 1999), when an exchange-rate–based disinflation 
program was implemented. In the meantime, two general elections were held; one on 
December 24, 1995 and the other on April 18, 1999. In 1996, the CBRT adopted an 
expansionary policy by announcing that financial stability was necessary to decrease 
Turkey’s high inflation. To limit the effects of the August 1998 Russian financial 
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crisis, Turkish monetary policy became relatively tighter for two months in 1998 (the 
upward movement in Figure 2 around July and August of that year), and seemed to 
provide a short pause for breath in this long expansionary run. However, militarily 
supported political turmoil, which had forced the prime minister’s resignation in 
1997, put pressure on the new government to employ populist policies.  
Nevertheless, by the end of 1999, an annual CPI inflation rate of around 70% 
urged tight monetary policy. As evident in Figure 2, an upward movement started in 
the first quarter of 2000 and continued until mid-2007. Actually, the first attempt to 
control inflation was an exchange-rate–based stabilization program introduced at the 
end of 1999. Despite decreasing confidence in the face of mounting current account 
deficits and a mild financial crisis in November 22, the program was implemented 
throughout 2000. On February 22, 2001, however, it was abandoned and after a 
significant level of devaluation, a floating exchange-rate regime was adopted, though 
tight monetary policy was not discarded. On April 25, 2001, the CBRT’s main target 
was set as inflation and it was given further independence by the parliament, 
including the choice of policy tool. The bank implemented an implicit inflation-
targeting policy between 2002 and 2006 and a conventional inflation-targeting policy 
afterwards, which were both quite successful at reducing the inflation rate from about 
30% in 2002 to about 8% by 2007.  
Although the CBRT had officially announced its inflation-targeting regime by 
2006, it never ruled out the financial stability leg of macroeconomic performance, 
partly because of past experiences of fiscal dominance. Ersel and Ozatay (2008) 
claimed that fiscal dominance due to high public debt had adversely affected 
monetary policy during the implicit inflation-targeting period, and indeed, the 
CBRT’s 2006 timing of shifting to a formal inflation-targeting regime was determined 
by its high degree of fiscal dominance. Accordingly, in implementing the regime, the 
CBRT has taken into account the fiscal side to sustain financial stability. As a result 
of this consideration, since mid-2007, monetary policy has more frequently switched 
between tight (i.e., when inflationary pressures are high) and expansionary (i.e., when 
current account deficits become overwhelmingly high) policies. In this regard, in two 
different periods (Q2-Q4 2009 and May 2011-January 2012) Figure 2 depicts tight 
monetary policies (upward movements). But on the other hand, it indicates a loose 
monetary policy (downward movement) between the last quarter of 2010 and mid-
2011.   
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It can also be inferred from the downward trend in Figure 2 that Turkish 
monetary policy held a loose stance until May 2009, as did the rest of the world’s 
economies. As a side effect, the TL began to depreciate by the last quarter of 2008. 
Consequently, while inflationary pressures hiked, current account deficits began to 
decrease in late 2008 and arrived at a six-year low by October 2009. Simultaneously, 
global conditions gradually improved. In fact, the second half of 2009 was when the 
first positive global indications were observed after the 2008 crisis. Therefore, under 
these domestic and global conditions, the CBRT had shifted to a tight policy by 
halting decreasing interest rates (overnight lending rates were lowered by 800 basis 
points in just seven months (by May 2009)). In an environment marked by the zero-
bound interest rates of Euro-area and US markets, maintaining high interest rates was 
quite contractionary. Figure 2 shows this path: a tight policy from mid-2009 until 
2010 prevented the TL from further depreciating and thus contained inflationary 
pressure.   
While the 2008 crisis created an expansionary environment in the US and 
Europe, decreased interest rates and additional liquidity measures directed a 
significant amount of capital to high-return-offering emerging markets. Turkey was 
one of those appealing countries; however, increased domestic consumption and 
credit growth was already a major problem for its anti-inflationary program at the 
time. Therefore, although higher interest rates could have been a remedy in repressing 
domestic capital growth, that was not an option because such interest rates could have 
enlarged the current account deficit via domestic currency appreciation under an 
environment of surging foreign capital. Under these conditions, the CBRT announced 
a new strategy in the last quarter of 2010:  an interest rate corridor. The aim was to 
dampen the surge of short-term capital inflow by creating ambiguity in interest rate 
movements. This interest rate corridor can be broadly defined as letting market 
interest rates swing between the CBRT’s overnight lending and borrowing rates rather 
than emphasizing the policy interest rate. Further, the CBRT lowered the lower band 
of the interest rate corridor from 5.75% in November 2010, and then to 1.50% in 
December 2010. By discouraging commercial banks from parking their excess 
liquidity in Turkey, monetary policy loosened. The policy was conducted under 
macro-prudential principles and domestic credit growth was controlled with 
supportive measures by Turkey’s Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency. The 
agency increased the required ratio of provisions for unsecured consumer credit and 
 18 
 
capital adequacy risk weights. In point of fact, the loose monetary policy continued 
about May 2011 until the the reinforcement of regular daily foreign exchange 
purchase auctions. Figure 2 shows a loose policy era between mid-2010 and mid-
2011.    
By the end of April 2011, the depreciation rate of the Turkish Lira against the 
Euro–Dollar basket reached almost 10% on average, compared to November 2010. 
The first sign of monetary tightening was heralded by twice increasing reserve 
requirements in April, from 12% to 15% in the first step, and then to 16% in the next. 
At the end of July, the depreciation rate was 6%, compared to the beginning of the 
month and the inflation trend was positive. That much depreciation inevitably put 
pressure on the inflation rate. Under these circumstances, the CBRT further tightened 
the policy by canceling foreign exchange purchase auctions after  July 22, and on 
August 5 increased the lower band of the interest rate corridor from 1.50% to 9% and 
started daily foreign exchange sales auctions. Under this quantitative tightening 
strategy, the CBRT also cancels one-week repo auctions might whenever the CBRT 
anticipated the necessity. The policy further tightened on October 2011 by an increase 
in the upper band of the interest rate corridor from 9% to 12.50%. This tight policy 
period after May 2011 can be observed in Figure 2 with the upward movement of the 
graph.          
      
 6. Empirical Evidence 
Identifying monetary policy within a VAR framework is challenging. Impulse 
responses, i.e., the time path of the model’s dependent variables, enclose a set of well-
known puzzles when there is an exogeneous change in another variable. Two of these 
puzzles are closely related to monetary policy stance. Accordingly, tight monetary 
policy, measured with a higher interest rate, may give higher instead of expectedly 
lower prices (price puzzle), and eventually depreciate local currency rather than 
appreciating it (exchange rate puzzle). One may visit Kim and Roubini (2000), for a 
further discussion of these issues.  
In this section, we present the results obtained from the set of VAR models, 
whose distinctive features comprise including the additional explanatory variables in 
the model (keeping spread measures in each model) or the length of the data span. We 
interpret the impulse responses of our basic model, where the variables are ordered as: 
exchange rate (Exchange Rate), the spread between the overnight interbank interest 
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rate and Treasury auction interest rate (spread), industrial production (IP) as a 
measure of income, and consumer price index (CPI) as a measure of prices. All 
variables enter the system in their logarithms except the spread. As Bayesian 
Information Criteria suggests, the lag order is 1. To account for seasonality, we 
include 11 monthly dummies. To account for financial crises, we include dummies for 
1994:04, 1994:05, 2000:11 2001:02, and 2001:03. 
 We assess the results and present graphs of the impulse responses generated 
by the same models. Figure 3 displays the estimated impulse responses in the wake of 
a contractionary monetary policy, depicted as a positive innovation in the 
interbank−Treasury auction interest rate spread in the macroeconomic variables 
considered. We report impulse responses for an 18-month horizon. The middle line 
shows the median of the draws and the other two lines show the confidence intervals 
at the 95% level. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
A positive shock to spread decreases (appreciates) exchange rate. Thus, we do 
not see the exchange rate puzzle. Second, the shock to spread persists for five months 
in a statistically significant fashion. The persistence of monetary policy is something 
expected. Output tends to decrease for three months and then return to its initial level. 
Eventually, tight monetary policy decreases prices. Thus, we do not see the price 
puzzle, either. Moreover, the decrease in prices is persistent. 
Further elaborating on the basic model, we first make a new specification and 
ended the sample data as of July 2011. We do this because on August 3, 2011, the 
CBRT publicly declared the over-week rate as its new policy tool, dropping the 
overnight rate. It also announced that, whenever it deemed necessary, it might not 
provide liquidity to the market on the normally scheduled auction dates. When an 
auction wasn’t called, these dates were called “exceptional days” and indeed, the 
CBRT did not fund the market on those days. Ultimately, there is a cliff between 
market overnight and official over-week rates in the exceptional days’ data. 
Nevertheless, Figure 4 shows the same estimate by replacing the overnight rate after 
August 2011 with the effective Interbank Overnight Funding rate, extending the 
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sample until 2012:07.
7
 By considering the unusual rate divergence on the exceptional 
days, we repeat the above exercise by replacing funding rate (the official over-week 
policy rate, constant at 5.75) with interbank rate after August 2011, but also include 
an intercept dummy after this date. We report the results in Figure 5. The estimates in 
Figures 4 and 5 are virtually unchanged. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
 
To assess the role and effect on market liquidity level when there was a 
change in monetary policy, we include M2 as an additional variable in our benchmark 
VAR model (see Figure 6). The higher the spread, the lower the output for six 
consecutive periods; this negative connection is statistically significant at least for 
three periods, in consistency with our benchmark specification. In coherence with the 
theoretical expectations, the amount of money also decreases, and is statistically 
significant for 16 months. A positive innovation of the spread also lowers exchange 
rate and decreases prices initially; however, these effects are not statistically 
significant.  
 
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
 
We use the spread between the interbank rate and the Treasury auction interest 
rate as an identification restriction. It is plausible that both the interbank and Treasury 
rates affect economic performance in a non-parallel fashion and thus, in order to 
account for this possibility, we entered these two variables separately. Figure 7 reports 
the corresponding impulse responses. A positive innovation in interbank rate 
increases (rather than decreases) exchange rate; thus the exchange rate puzzle exists. 
Second, a positive interest rate innovation increases (rather than decreases) prices; 
thus the price puzzle also exists. From these results we conclude that positive 
innovations interbank rate solely as a policy tool or as an identifier of monetary policy 
tool is problematic. 
 
                                                 
7
 See Figure A1 in the appendix, which is created from the accumulated spread innovations gathered 
until July 2012. Accordingly, it can be inferred from figure that a tight monetary policy is still in effect. 
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[Insert Figure 7 about here] 
 
By considering the CBRT’s dual policy tool that had been used prior to March 
2001 (i.e., targeting the overnight interbank interest and exchange rates), Berument 
(2007) suggested using the spread between the interbank rate and the monthly 
depreciation rate of the Turkish Lira to identify the monetary policy. Hence, we 
replaced Treasury spread with exchange rate spread and Figure 8 shows the 
corresponding impulse responses. Unlike in our benchmark specification, we do not 
observe the exchange rate puzzle but we still see the price puzzle. 
 
[Insert Figure 8 about here] 
 
In order to account for the liquidity that the CBRT provides, Berument et al. 
(2011) employed an analogue of NBRs, which, unlike the US equivalent, includes the 
funding from foreign exchange market interventions. Figure 9 shows an impulse 
response analysis of when a one-standard-deviation shock to spread is introduced 
when this new liquidity measure is also introduced to the system. The figure suggests 
that the new liquidity measure (L) is not affected in a statistically significant fashion, 
and the impulses for other variables are robust. 
 
[Insert Figure 9 about here] 
 
Berument et al. (2011) successfully showed that L can be taken as a measure 
of monetary policy in Turkey until 2010. Although we lack sufficient observations, 
we specify the model with one lag for the post-2010 era. Figure 10 reports the impulse 
responses when we introduce a one-standard-deviation shock to L. Not surprisingly, 
most of the evidence is not statistically significant, but it does indicate that a positive 
L measure decreases but not increases prices. 
 
[Insert Figure 10 about here] 
 
Figure 11 reports impulse responses for the post-2002 era after the 2001 financial 
crisis. Similar issues prevail. 
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[Insert Figure 11 about here] 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper proposes that innovations in the spread between the CBRT’s 
overnight rates and Treasury auction interest rates are informative for output and 
prices in Turkey. This rationality arises from the fact that the spread serves well as a 
transmitter between the monetary policy/objective and target variables such as prices, 
output, and exchange rate. In this manner, while the CBRT’s overnight interest rate 
stands for the measure of the funding rate of the financial system’s assets, the 
Treasury auction interest rate denotes a measure that the financial system can change 
in its assets in comparison with the funding rate. Tightness of monetary policy is 
implied by the size of the spread. That is, an increase in this measure can be taken as a 
measure of higher funding cost and therefore illiquidity.  
The empirical evidence suggests that tight monetary policy measured by the 
spread defined herein decreases output temporarily and permanently appreciates local 
currency and decreases prices. Thus, this specification eliminates well-known 
exchange rate and price puzzles. The empirical evidence is robust for different 
specifications formed by including different relevant variables and for different 
sample sizes set according to the possible threshold dates representing radical policy 
shifts.  
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Figure 1: Interbank Overnight Interest Rates and Treasury Auction Interest Rates 
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Figure 2: Accumulated Innovations to Spread 
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to Monetary Shocks: 1988:8-2011:7 
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Figure 4:  Impulse Responses to Monetary Shocks: 1988:8- 2012:7 
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Figure 5:  Impulse Responses to Monetary Shocks with the Policy Rate: 1988:8-
2012:7 
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Figure 6:  Impulse Responses to Monetary Shocks, including M2 
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Figure 7:  Impulse Responses to Interest Rate Shocks 
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Figure 8:  Impulse Responses to Interest Rate-Depreciation Spread Shocks 
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Figure 9: Impulse Responses When a Shock to Spread is given with the New 
Liquidity Measure 
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Figure 10: Impulse Responses When a Shock to the New Liquidity Measure is given 
for post-2010:01. 
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Figure 11 Impulse Responses When a Shock to the New Liquidity Measure is given 
for the Full Sample. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1: Accumulated Innovations to Spread 
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